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We show that, under some natural conditions, the pairs ðr; sÞ produced by the
elliptic curve ElGamal signature scheme are uniformly distributed. In particular, this
implies that values of r and s are not correlated. The result is based on some new
estimates of exponential sums. For the ElGamal signature over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, a similar
result has been obtained by the second author. # 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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distribution.1. INTRODUCTION
Let p  3 be a prime and let g be a primitive root modulo p. For an
integer m 2, we also denote by Zm residue ring modulo m (which we
identify with the set of integers f0; . . . ;m 1g) and by Z*m the group of units
of Zm.
The ElGamal signature scheme can be described in the following way. Let
M be a ﬁnite set of messages to be signed and let h :M! Zp1 be an
arbitrary function, usually called a hash-function. We assume that the
primitive root g is publicly known. The signer ﬁxes a certain element a 2
Zp1 which is the secret key known only to the signer and makes the value
A 	 ga ðmod pÞ publicly known. Finally, for an integer k 2 Z*p1 called a
nonce and a message m 2M we deﬁne the functions rðkÞ and sðk;mÞ by1To whom correspondence should be addressed.
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rðkÞ 	 gk ðmod pÞ; 0
 rðkÞ 
 p  1;
sðk;mÞ 	 k1ðhðmÞ þ arðkÞÞ ðmod p  1Þ; 0
 sðk;mÞ 
 p  2;
and call the pair ðrðkÞ; sðk;mÞÞ the ElGamal signature of the message m with
nonce k, see [6, 12]. It has been shown in [10] that the distribution of pairs
ðrðkÞ; sðk; mÞÞ is asymptotically uniform in the rectangle ½0;p  1  ½0;p  2.
The elliptic curve ElGamal signature is the elliptic curve analogue of the
above algorithm (see [4]). ECDSA uses an elliptic curve E over Fp. If M ¼
jEðFpÞj denotes the number of rational points over Fp, it is well known that
jM  p  1j 
 2p1=2
and that EðFpÞ together with the point at inﬁnity O form an Abelian group,
see [11].
Let N be a divisor of M and let G 2 EðFpÞ be a ﬁxed point of prime order
N , that is, NG ¼ O, where O is the point at inﬁnity. Both G and N are
publicly known. For a point Q 2 EðFpÞ, we denote by xðQÞ,
0
 xðQÞ 
 p  1, the ﬁrst component of Q ¼ ðx; yÞ in the afﬁne model of
E. The signer’s secret key is again an element a 2 Z*N .
To sign a message m 2M, one chooses a random integer k 2 Z*N usually
called the nonce, and which must be kept secret. One then deﬁnes the
following two integers:
rðkÞ ¼ xðkGÞ;
sðk;mÞ 	 k1ðhðmÞ þ arðkÞÞ ðmod N Þ; 0
 sðk;mÞ 
 N  1;
where now h :M! ZN . The pair ðrðkÞ;sðk;mÞÞ is the elliptic curve ElGamal
signature of the message m with a nonce k.
In this paper, we obtain the elliptic curve analogue of the result of [10] and
show that the pairs ðrðkÞ;sðk;mÞÞ are uniformly distributed in the rectangle
½0;p  1  ½0;N  1. We remark that even studying only the
ﬁrst component rðkÞ is not trivial and require several algebraic geometry
tools [5].
Although the uniformity of distribution results of [10] and this paper do
not have any immediate implications for the security of the corresponding
cryptographic constructions, they still provide some intuitive motivation for
such conclusions. In particular, in each of the above cases the inverse
statement (about non-uniformity of distribution) would be disastrous for
the corresponding construction.
On the other hand, surprisingly enough, certain uniformity of distribution
properties could be a tool for an attack as well. For example, a statement
about the uniform distribution of the elements ðkÞðk; mÞ1, corresponding to
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modiﬁcations (including the elliptic curve version) has been used in [3, 7, 8]
to give a rigorous proof of a certain weakness in these schemes. We recall
that the Digital Signature Algorithm is a variant of the ElGamal signature
with p  1 replaced by a prime divisor q of p  1, see [6, 12]. Also, ðkÞ is now
the results of the double reduction of gk, ﬁrstly modulo p and then modulo
q. This double reduction erases the arithmetic structure of exponential
function and makes the studying of the pairs ððkÞ; ðk;mÞÞ much more
complicated. In particular, despite that, as we have mentioned, the
uniformity of distribution results have been proved for the ratios
ðkÞðk;mÞ1, it is still an open problem to establish such a result for the
pairs ððkÞ; ðk; mÞÞ themselves.
Our result is based on a new upper bound of exponential sums with linear
combinations of rðkÞ and sðk;mÞ which can be of independent interest.
Throughout the paper the implied constants in symbols ‘O’ and 5 may
occasionally, where obvious, depend on the small positive parameter E and
are absolute otherwise (we recall that U ¼ OðV Þ and U5V are equivalent).
They all are effective and can be explicitly evaluated.
2. EXPONENTIAL SUMS
For an integer m 2, we deﬁne emðzÞ ¼ expð2piz=mÞ and consider
exponential sums
Sða; bÞ ¼
X
k2Z *N
X
m2M
epðarðkÞÞeN ðbsðk;mÞÞ:
Here we obtain some results about exponential sums with rðkÞ and sðk;mÞ
which can be of independent interest.
We need the following estimate which is Corollary 1 of [5] (where we take
into account that deg x ¼ 2 in the notation of that paper).
Lemma 1. Let Q 2 E be a point of order t. Then, the bound
maxgcd ða;pÞ¼1
Xt
k¼1
epðaxðkQÞÞ
 
 4p1=2
holds.
We also need the following well-known basic identity (see [3, Chap. 3,
Problem 11.a]). For any integers u and m 2,
Xm1
c¼0
emðcuÞ ¼
0 if uc0 ðmodmÞ;
m if u 	 0 ðmodmÞ:
(
ð1Þ
First of all, we consider the sums Sða; bÞ with b ¼ 0.
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m 2.
Lemma 2. For any a 2 Zp * the bound
jSða; 0Þj 
 jMj2nðp1Þþ2p1=2
holds.
Proof. Let mðmÞ denote the Mobius function. We recall that mð1Þ ¼
1;mðmÞ ¼ 0 if m 2 is not square-free and mðmÞ ¼ ð1ÞnðmÞ otherwise. Using
the Mobius function mðdÞ over divisors of N to detect the co-primality
condition, we obtain (see [13, Chap. 2, Sect. 3.d])
Sða; 0Þ ¼ jMj
X
d jN
mðdÞ
XN
k¼1
k	0 ðmod dÞ
epðaxðkGÞÞ
¼
X
d jN
mðdÞ
XN=d
k¼1
epðaxðkdGÞÞ:
Because dG is of multiplicative order N=d, we can apply Lemma 1 to get
jSða; 0Þj 
 4jMjp1=2
X
d jN
jmðdÞj:
Noting that X
d jN
mðdÞ ¼ 2nðN Þ;
we obtain the desired statement. &
For a hash function h :M! ZN , we also denote by W the number of
pairs ðm1;m2Þ 2M
2 with hðm1Þ ¼ hðm2Þ. Thus, W =jMj
2 is the probability of a
collision and our results are non-trivial under a reasonable assumption that
this probability is of order of magnitude close to 1=N .
Now we can state the following:
Lemma 3. For any a 2 Zp and b 2 N with b=0, the bound
jSða; bÞj 
 ðdjðN ÞNW Þ1=2
holds, where d ¼ gcdðb;N Þ.
Proof. We have
jSða; bÞj 

X
k2Z *N
epðarðkÞÞeN ðbak1rðkÞÞ
X
m2M
eN ðbk1hðmÞÞ




X
k2Z *N
X
m2M
eN ðbk1hðmÞÞ
  ¼X
k2Z *N
X
m2M
eN ðbkhðmÞÞ
 :
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k 2 ZN , we obtain
jSða; bÞj2 
 jðN Þ
X
k2ZN
X
m2M
eN ðbkhðmÞÞ
 2
¼ jðN Þ
X
m1;m22M
X
k2ZN
eN ðbkðhðm1Þ  hðm2ÞÞÞ:
From Lemma 1, we conclude that
jSða; bÞj2 
 jðN ÞNV ; ð2Þ
where V is the number of solutions of the congruence
bðhðm1Þ  hðm2ÞÞ 	 0 ðmod N Þ; m1;m2 2M;
or equivalently of the congruence
hðm1Þ 	 hðm2Þ ðmod N=dÞ; m1;m2 2M:
Therefore,
V 

Xd1
j¼0
Uj;
where Uj is the number of solutions of the congruence
hðm1Þ 	 hðm2Þ þ jN=d ðmod N Þ; m1;m2 2M:
In particular, U0 ¼ W . Using Lemma 1, we derive
Uj ¼
X
m1;m22M
1
N
XN1
c¼0
eN ðcðhðm1Þ  hðm2Þ  jN=dÞÞ
¼
1
N
XN1
c¼0
eN ðcjN=dÞ
X
m1;m22M
eN ðcðhðm1Þ  hðm2ÞÞÞ
¼
1
N
XN1
c¼0
eN ðcjN=dÞ
X
m2M
eN ðchðmÞÞ
 2


1
N
XN1
c¼0
X
m2M
eN ðchðmÞÞ
 2¼ U0 ¼ W :
Therefore V 
 dW and from (2) we obtain the desired result. &
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Here we obtain our main result.
Given a set S of T points ðuj; vjÞ 2 ½0; 12, j ¼ 1; . . . ; T , of the unit square,
we deﬁne the discrepancy DðSÞ of this set as
DðSÞ ¼ supB
ASðBÞ
T
 jBj

;
where the supremum is taken over all boxesB ¼ ½a;b  ½g; d  ½0; 12, jBj ¼
ðb aÞðd gÞ and ASðBÞ is the number of points of this set which hit B.
According to a standard principle, we can bound the discrepancy DðSÞ by
bounding the corresponding exponential sums. For arbitrary sets such a
relation is given by the Erdos–Turan–Koksma inequality (see [2, Theorem
1.21]) which we present in the following form.
For an integer a we deﬁne %a ¼ maxfjaj; 1g.
Lemma 4. For any integer L 1, the bound
DðSÞ5
1
L
þ
1
T
X
05jajþjbj5L
1
%a %b
XT
j¼1
expð2piðauj þ bvjÞÞ
 
holds.
Let o be the probability of collision of the hash function h, that is,
o ¼
W
jMj2
:
Theorem 5. For any e > 0, for the discrepancy DðSÞ of the set of jðN Þj
Mj points
S ¼
rðkÞ
p
;
sðk;mÞ
N
 
: k 2 Z*N ; m 2M
 
;
the bound DðSÞ ¼ Oðo1=2N eÞ holds.
Proof. Select T ¼ jðN ÞjMj and L ¼ p in Lemma 4. If b ¼ 0, then a=0
and we apply Lemma 2. For b=0, we apply Lemma 3, to get
DðSÞ5
1
p
þ
1
jðN ÞjMj
X
05jaj
p
Sða; 0Þ
%a

þ
X
d jN
X
0
jaj5p
X
05jbj5p
gcdðb;NÞ¼d
Sða; bÞ
%a %b
!
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1
p
þ
2nðp1Þp1=2 log p
jðN Þ
þ
ðNW Þ1=2
jðN Þ1=2jMjX
d jN
d1=2
X
0
jaj
p1
X
05jbj5p
d jb
1
%a %b
:
Now, the ﬁrst term never dominates, and substituting b ¼ cd, we obtain
DðSÞ5
2nðp1Þp1=2 log p
jðN Þ
þ
ðNW Þ1=2
jðN Þ1=2jMjX
d jN
1
d1=2
X
0
jaj5p
X
05jcj5p=d
1
%a %c
5
2nðp1Þp1=2 log p
jðN Þ
þ
ðNW Þ1=2tðN Þ log2 p
jðN Þ1=2jMj
(because N 
 2p), where tðmÞ denotes the number of positive integer
divisors of m 2. We recall that
m
jðmÞ
¼ Oðlog logðmþ 1ÞÞ and log tðmÞ ¼ O
logm
log logðmþ 1Þ
 
;
see [9, Theorems 5.1 and 5.2]. Also, from the inequality nðmÞ! 
 m, we derive
nðmÞ ¼ O
logm
log logðmþ 1Þ
 
:
Therefore, for any e > 0
DðSÞ ¼ OðN1=2þe þ o1=2peÞ: ð3Þ
We remark that o 1=N . Indeed, let H ðlÞ be the number of messages
m 2M with hðmÞ ¼ l. Then,X
l2ZN
H ðlÞ ¼ jMj and
X
l2ZN
H ðlÞ2 ¼ W :
Thus, from the Cauchy inequality we derive
jMj2 ¼
X
l2ZN
H ðlÞ
	 
2

 N
X
l2ZN
H ðlÞ2 ¼ NW :
Hence, the ﬁrst term in (3) never dominates, and the result follows. &
We remark that for any practically useful hash function o ¼ OðN1þeÞ (in
fact, one should even expect o 1=N ), the bound of Theorem 5 becomes of
the form DðSÞ ¼ OðN1=2þeÞ.
Finally, we note that unfortunately our analysis cannot be extended to the
elliptic curve analogue of the digital signature scheme, see [1].
EL MAHASSNI AND SHPARLINSKI596As usual Fp and Zp denote ﬁelds of p elements and the residue ring
modulo p  1, respectively. We assume that Fp consists of elements f0; 1;
. . . ;p  1g and Zp consists of elements f0; 1; . . . ;p  2g. We also denote by
Zp * the group of units of Zp.
For integers s and m 1 we denote by bsmc the remainder of s on division
by m. We also use log z to denote the binary logarithm of z > 0.
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